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PERSON V. POTENTIAL: JUDICIAL STRUGGLES TO 
DECIDE CLAIMS ARISING FROM THE DEATH OF AN 
EMBRYO OR FETUS? AND MICHIGAN’S STRUGGLE TO 
SETTLE THE QUESTION 
Dena M. Marks∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION - OVERVIEW AND SCOPE 
“Death is well understood; it’s life that isn’t.”1  We recognize 
death, but state by state, courts struggle to understand life when called 
on to determine whether their states’ wrongful death acts apply after the 
death of an embryo or fetus.2  These struggles arise because, for the most 
part, state legislatures have failed to clarify3 whether a cause of action 
may be maintained under their wrongful death acts for the death of an 
embryo or fetus.4  This failure has lead to inconsistent and unfair results, 
often allowing the tortfeasor to benefit from causing the greater harm of 
death, when the tortfeasor would have been liable if only injury had 
resulted.5 
 
?  Embryo: “In humans, the developing organism from conception until approximately the 
end of the second month.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 501 (25th ed. 1990).  Fetus: “In 
humans, the product of conception from the end of the eighth week to the moment of birth.”  Id. at 
573. 
∗  Associate Professor and Assistant Dean, J.D. Program, Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 
Oakland (MI) Campus. 
 1. Members of the Famous Quotes and Famous Sayings Network, Famous Quotes and 
Famous Sayings Network, http://home.att.net/~quotesexchange/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2003) 
(attributing the quotation to Tony Follari). 
 2. Appellate courts in nearly every state have been called on to decide whether a cause of 
action for wrongful death can be maintained after the death of an embryo or fetus, See infra notes 
34-428 and accompanying text.  Yet only four, and arguably five, states have specifically passed 
legislation to provide the answer to that question. See infra notes 358-85, 429-39 and accompanying 
text. 
 3. In Michigan, lack of clarity is not the result of legislative inaction, it is the product of 
misguided legislative action.  See infra notes 440-74 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 37-384 and accompanying text. 
 5. See, e.g., Gorke v. LeClerc, 181 A.2d 448, 451 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962). 
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In Part II of this article, the history and purpose of wrongful death 
acts are examined.  Part III examines, state by state, the inconsistent 
results caused by legislative failure to act.  Part IV focuses on the 
inconsistent results within one jurisdiction, Michigan, and examines that 
state’s legislative attempt to provide the guidance called for in the 
article.  Part V suggests a redrafted version of the Michigan statute, to 
clearly provide the guidance needed by the court.  Finally, Part VI 
challenges state legislatures to respond to the problem by passing 
legislation that clarifies and directs the courts how to understand life, as 
it applies to embryonic or fetal death. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Purpose of Wrongful Death Acts 
Wrongful death acts developed because, under English common 
law, a personal injury action did not survive the victim’s death.6  As a 
result, there was “no compensation for the victim’s dependents or 
heirs,”7 making it “cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to 
injure him.”8  In England, this inequity was first remedied with the 
passage of the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846.9  This Act was commonly 
known as Lord Campbell’s Act, and it created the basis for modern-day 
wrongful death statutes in the United States.10  Lord Campbell’s Act 
permitted a claim to be brought “for the benefit of the wife, husband, 
parent or child of the person whose death shall have been so caused” by 
the tortfeasor.11 Now, in every state, if a person dies as a result of the 
defendant’s wrongdoing, a cause of action is available.12 
 
 6. W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 125A at 940 (5th ed. 1984). 
 7. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 525 (W. Va. 1995) (relying on KEETON, ET. AL., supra 
note 6, § 127 at 945). 
 8. KEETON, supra note 6, § 127 at 945. 
 9. Id.  The “Act permitted recovery of damages by the close relatives of a victim who was 
tortiously killed.”  Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 525. 
 10. Id. at 525 (noting that New York enacted the first state wrongful death statute in 1847). 
 11. O’Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785, 793 (Mich. 1971) (quoting Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 
180, 194 (1867)).  Thus, “the English Parliament rectified the disparity between a tortfeasor’s 
liability for injuries and for the more egregious harm, death.”  Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 525. 
 12. KEETON, supra note 6, § 127 at 945.  In some jurisdictions, the action that would have 
been the decedent’s is preserved as a survival action.  Id. § 125A at 942.  The injury to the 
decedent’s survivors is preserved as a wrongful death action.  Id. at 940-41.  Some jurisdictions 
have combined the two types of injuries into one statute usually referring to the action as a wrongful 
death action.  Id. at 942.  Unless otherwise noted, in this article, the cause of action referred to and 
analyzed is a wrongful death action, even if the jurisdiction also has a survival statute. 
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B.   Wrongful Death Claims for the In Utero Death of an Embryo or 
Fetus13 
Even after wrongful death statutes were enacted, courts continued 
to deny recovery for the death of an unborn embryo or fetus.14  In 
denying recovery, the courts stated that the unborn embryo or fetus was 
merely a part of the mother, and not a person, and a defendant could not 
owe a duty if the unborn fetus or embryo was not a person in existence.15  
Under this view, no court permitted a wrongful death claim, unless the 
child was first born alive.16 
C.  Born Alive 
The born-alive rule persisted in wrongful death actions even after 
the courts began allowing recovery for other injuries incurred 
prenatally.17  The courts used four theories to deny a cause of action for 
the wrongful death of an unborn embryo or fetus: lack of precedent;18 
the single entity theory;19 potential for fraudulent claims or double 
recovery;20 or an inability to expand the scope of liability created by the 
legislature in enacting the wrongful death statute.21  Some jurisdictions 
still require a live birth before a wrongful death cause of action is 
allowed.22 
 
 13. In general, the common law did not permit a cause of action for any tort committed 
against the unborn.  Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526.  This changed in 1946 when the court, in Bonbrest v. 
Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), held a claim could be brought on behalf of a child after she 
was born for injuries that she suffered as a viable fetus.  Id. at 143.  Before that, courts had denied 
tort recovery for these injuries based on the “assumption that a child en ventre sa mere has no 
juridical existence, and is so intimately united with its mother as to be a ‘part’ of her and as a 
consequence is not to be regarded as a separate, distinct, and individual entity.”  Id. at 139.  This 
article deals only with causes of action where the injury to the unborn embryo or fetus was death. 
 14. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), overruled by, 
Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967). 
 15. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 139. 
 16. The first published case in the United States to recognize a wrongful death cause of action 
without a live birth was Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949). 
 17. See, e.g., Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 305-06 (Fla. 1977). 
 18. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 529.  See also White v. Yup, 458 P2d 617, 623 (Nev. 1969); 
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Wis. 1967). 
 19. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 529. 
 20. Id.  See also Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916, 919 (Mass. 1975). 
 21. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 530. 
 22. See infra notes 34-119 and accompanying text. 
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D.  Viability23 
In 1949, the Minnesota Supreme Court was the first to reject the 
born-alive rule, in favor of the viability rule.24  In Verkennes v. Corniea25 
the court held that a viable fetus was not a single entity with its mother 
because it was capable of life separate and independent from her.26  The 
court said that the mother may die, but the child may still live on.27  The 
single-entity theory was, therefore, found to be irreconcilable with 
medical reality28 and was rejected by the court.29  Over time, most 
jurisdictions have adopted the viability rule in wrongful death actions.30 
E.  Previability 
Recently, some jurisdictions have allowed a wrongful death claim 
even when the tortfeasor’s action resulted in the death of an embryo or 
previable fetus.31  Some of these jurisdictions have done so as a result of 
legislation specifically enacted to create a cause of action for the death 
of an embryo or fetus,32 while others were a result of a court’s 
interpretation of the jurisdiction’s general wrongful death act.33 
III.  JURISDICTIONAL BREAKDOWN BY VIEW APPLIED IN A WRONGFUL 
DEATH CLAIM FOR AN EMBRYO OR FETUS 
A.  Born Alive 
Although these jurisdictions are in a minority, arguably, there are 
fourteen jurisdictions that still bar a cause of action for the death of a 
fetus unless the fetus is ultimately born alive.34 
 
 23. “Capability of living; the state of being viable; usually connotes a fetus that has reached 
500 g in weight and 20 gestational weeks.”  STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1714 (25th ed. 
1990). 
 24. Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 841. 
 27. Id. at 840. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 841. 
 30. See infra notes 120-349 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra notes 350-85 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 358-75 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra notes 354-57, 376-85 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 35-119 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Alaska 
Alaska has no published opinions discussing whether a viable fetus 
is a person under the state’s wrongful death act.35  But in Mace v. Jung,36 
the federal district court held that a previable fetus was not a person 
under Alaska’s wrongful death act.37  In its analysis, the court first 
recognized that until 1946 a wrongful death action was unavailable for 
the death of a fetus; the child had to be born alive.38  The court then 
looked to outside jurisdictions and concluded that, although there was a 
growing trend permitting a cause of action for the death of a viable fetus, 
it found no basis for allowing recovery for a previable fetus’s death.39  
Thus, the court denied this cause of action and left intact the prevailing 
rule that a child must be born alive before a wrongful death claim could 
be maintained.40 
2.  California 
Justus v. Atchinson41 involved the deaths of two full-term fetuses.42  
Although the court recognized that many jurisdictions would permit a 
wrongful death cause of action under these circumstances,43 the court 
stated that it could not recognize a cause of action here because the 
cause of action was merely “a creature of statute . . . [that] ‘exists only 
so far and in favor of such person as the legislative power may 
declare.’”44  Further, the court stated that the wrongful death act 
permitted recovery only for the death of “a person,”45 and the court 
reasoned that, because the common law interpretation of person did not 
include a fetus, and because “the word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not include the unborn,”46 the legislature did not 
 
 35. See Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706, 707 (D. Alaska 1962). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 708. 
 38. Id. at 707. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 707, 708. 
 41. Justus v. Atchinson, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977), overruled in part by Ochoa v. Superior 
Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985) (overruling the Atchinson court’s holdings on the “claim of shock” 
cause of action). 
 42. Id. at 125. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 129 (quoting Pritchard v. Whitney Estate Co., 129 P. 989, 992 (Cal. 1913)).  The 
Justus court also stated that the wrongful death act should not be liberally construed to fulfill a 
remedial purpose because it is in abrogation of the common law, and, therefore, it must be strictly 
construed.  Id. at 133. 
 45. Id. at 129. 
 46. Id. at 131 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973)). 
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intend the word person in the wrongful death act to include an unborn 
fetus.47  Finally, the court reasoned that the statute could not create a 
cause of action for the death of these stillborn fetuses because the 
legislature did not “confer legal personality on unborn fetuses” in the 
wrongful death act.48  Instead of including these unborn fetuses in the 
wrongful death act, the legislature “impliedly but plainly exclude[d]” 
them.49 
3.  Florida 
Similarly, the Florida courts have concluded that a live birth is 
required to create a cause of action for wrongful death.50  In Stern v. 
Miller,51 a viable fetus52 was stillborn following an automobile 
accident.53  The court held that the wrongful death act did not create a 
cause of action for a stillborn fetus.54  That court stated that, although 
many jurisdictions would have allowed this claim, and although the 
wrongful death statute was remedial and should be interpreted liberally, 
it was constrained to interpret the statute consistent with legislative 
intent.55  In evaluating legislative intent, the court noted that the 
legislature had enacted other legislation that specifically provided for an 
unborn child, but in the wrongful death act, it did not.56  Therefore, the 
court concluded that the legislature’s intent was to exclude a cause of 
action under the wrongful death act for the death of an unborn fetus.57  
The court further reasoned that because the legislature knew of the 
court’s previous exclusion of these claims under the earlier act, if it had 
intended unborn fetuses to have a cause of action under the amended 
wrongful death act, it would have specifically provided for that in the 
amendment.58 
 
 47. Id. at 133-34. 
 48. Id. at 132. 
 49. Id.  The court relied primarily on the legislature’s enactment of statutes where fetal rights 
were specifically granted: tort recovery for prenatal injury; property rights; and penal statutes.  Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1977). 
 51. Id. 
 52. The fetus was of seven-months gestational age.  Id. at 304. 
 53. Id. at 305. 
 54. Id. at 307.  The court had previously interpreted Florida’s Wrongful Death of Minors Act, 
section 768.03 and denied a cause of action for the death of a stillborn fetus.  Id. at 305.  That act 
was repealed in 1972, and the one now being interpreted by the court was enacted.  Id. at 306.  The 
1972 act created one “general action for the wrongful death of any ‘person.’”  Id. 
 55. Id. at 308. 
 56. Id. at 306-07. 
 57. Id. at 307. 
 58. Id. at 308. 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss1/2
MARKS2-CHRIS EXTRA.DOC 2/16/2004  11:01 AM 
2004] PERSON V. POTENTIAL 47 
4.  Indiana 
In Indiana, the child wrongful death statute does not create a cause 
of action, unless there is a live birth.59  In Bolin v. Wingert, although the 
fetus was previable at the time of its death, the Indiana Supreme Court 
did not do a viability analysis to determine whether a wrongful death 
action could be maintained.60  Rather, the court looked solely at the 
language of the state’s Child Wrongful Death Statute.61  The court said 
that because the wrongful death act was in derogation of the common 
law, it should be strictly construed.62  The court reasoned that, because 
the legislature failed to provide specifically for a cause of action for the 
death of an unborn fetus, unlike its action in enacting parts of the penal 
code, the legislature’s intent was to exclude a cause of action under this 
statute, unless there was a live birth.63 
5.  Iowa 
Iowa death statutes are survival statutes, and they do not “create a 
new cause of action in a decedent’s survivors.”64  Therefore, in Iowa, 
only those born alive have “attained a recognized individual identity” 
required to maintain a cause of action under the state’s death act.65  In 
Weitl v. Moes, the court held that the stillbirth of a viable fetus did not 
create a cause of action because it was not a death of a person.66  In its 
analysis, the court began by stating that, at common law, an unborn fetus 
was not a person.67  The court reasoned that because a wrongful death 
claim was in derogation of the common law, created only by legislation, 
if the legislature had also intended to abrogate the common-law meaning 
 
 59. Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ind. 2002). 
 60. The court stated that the two parties disagreed about the applicability of the statute 
because the defendant claimed that the fetus must be viable before there was a cause of action, and 
the plaintiff claimed that the statute was applicable for the death of any unborn child. Id. at 204.  
But in its analysis, the court disregarded the issue of the fetus’ viability.  Id. at 206-08. 
 61. IND. CODE § 34-1-1-8(e) (1993), repealed (see IND. CODE § 34-23-2-1 (1999)).  Bolin, 
764 N.E.2d at 206-08. 
 62. Id. at 207. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 270 (Iowa 1981) (plurality), overruled in part by 
Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983) (holding 
that minor does not have an independent cause of action from statute for parential consortium, and a 
minors damages are not limited to the period of the child’s minority). 
 65. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 271 (quoting Cardwell V. Welch, 213 S.E.2d 382, 383 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1975). 
 66. Id. at 272.  The stillborn’s mother was misdiagnosed and incorrectly treated for bronchitis, 
which resulted in brain damage, blindness, and stillbirth of the near-term fetus.  Id. at 261. 
 67. Id. at 271 (relying on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
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of person to include a fetus, it would have specifically done so.68  The 
court further reasoned that there was no legislative intent to include an 
unborn fetus under this act because the legislature had not taken any 
action to amend this statute after the court’s previous interpretation of 
this statute, which required a live birth.69 
6.  Maine 
In Shaw v. Jendzejec,70 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
harshly criticized its own earlier decision71 requiring a live birth before a 
wrongful death action could be maintained.72  But it concluded “that the 
force of stare decisis compels us to reaffirm” that holding.73  In its 
reasoning, the court first looked for a legislative response to its earlier 
decision, and found no statutory amendment.74  It also evaluated the 
“harshness that results from the live-birth rule,” and found it insufficient 
to overrule its prior decision.75  Finally, the court analyzed courts’ 
interpretations from other jurisdictions since its earlier decision, and it 
found that only Montana and Hawaii had yet adopted the viability 
view.76  Based on these findings, the Maine Supreme Court found 
insufficient reason to recognize a wrongful death cause of action without 
a live birth.77 
7.  Nebraska 
In 1977, the Nebraska Supreme Court confirmed that there must be 
a live birth before there was a cause of action under the state’s wrongful 
death act,78 and that the stillbirth of a viable fetus was insufficient to 
create a wrongful death cause of action.79  The court stated that because 
a child born dead was not a person within the law of torts, its death could 
 
 68. Id. at 271.  In fact, the court pointed out, that the legislature has done so in penal statutes.  
Id. 
 69. Id. at 272.  The court previously excluded a cause of action for the death of a previable 
fetus under the same statute.  McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1971). 
 70. Shaw v. Jendzejec, 717 A.2d 367 (Me.1998). 
 71. Miton v. Cary Med. Ctr., 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988). 
 72. Shaw, 717 A.2d at 369-71. 
 73. Id. at 368. 
 74. Id. at 371. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at n.10. 
 77. Id. at 371-72. 
 78. Egbert v. Wenzl, 260 N.W.2d 480 (Neb. 1977).  The case upheld a 26 year-old decision: 
Drabbels v Skelly Oil Co., 50 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 1951). 
 79. The fetus was eight-months gestational age.  Egbert, 260 N.W.2d at 481. 
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not create a cause of action under the state’s wrongful death act.80  The 
court further stated that because the cause of action was strictly 
statutory, and not a “matter of ‘evolution’ of the common law,” only 
legislative intent in enacting the statute should be used to interpret it.81  
And the court reasoned that the legislature’s failure to define an unborn 
fetus as a person under the act, despite 26 years to do so, indicated the 
legislature’s intent to exclude unborn fetuses under the act.82 
8.  New Jersey 
In New Jersey, the courts have held that because wrongful death 
was not actionable at common law, the cause of action should only be 
allowed for the death of a person, as provided in the statute.83  In 
Giardina v. Bennett, the court held that the death of a viable fetus did not 
create a cause of action under the state’s wrongful death act.84  The court 
stated that, at common law, an unborn fetus was “merely a part of his 
mother without separate existence or personality,” and because the 
legislature had specifically addressed legal protection for the unborn in 
property and penal statutes, its failure to do so here made it “inferable 
that the Legislature adopted [the] common law understanding of the 
concept of a ‘person’ in the adoption of the Wrongful Death Act.”85  The 
court further reasoned that the legislature’s failure to amend the Act 
despite the court’s similar, previous interpretations also indicated that 
the legislature intended to exclude these causes of action under the 
statute.86  The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions allowed a 
cause of action for viable fetuses, but the court stated that this merely 
substituted “one bright-line rule, viability, for another, live-birth,” and 
that there was “no compelling underlying policy that would impel [it] to 
give the statutory term ‘person’ an expansive interpretation.”87 
9.  New York 
In New York, there is no wrongful death cause of action for a 
stillborn fetus.88  In Endres v. Friedbert, the court affirmed its long-held 
 
 80. Id. at 481. 
 81. Id. at 482. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139, 144 (N.J.1988). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 143, 145. 
 86. Id. at 146. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 902-03 (N.Y. 1969). 
9
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interpretation that “the law has never considered the unborn fetus as 
having a separate ‘juridical existence’ or a legal personality or identity 
‘until it sees the light of day.’”89  Although the court acknowledged that 
other jurisdictions permitted a cause of action at viability, the court 
reasoned that this would only relocate the point at which the cause of 
action would be recognized, and it would “increase a hundredfold the 
problems of causation and damages.”90  “[A] tangible and concrete event 
would be the most acceptable and workable boundary.  Birth, being a 
definite, observable and significant event, meets this requirement.”91  
The court also stated that “the damages recoverable by the parents in 
their own right afford ample redress for the wrong done.”92 
10.  Tennessee 
In Hamby v. McDaniel,93 the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed 
its earlier decision94 that there is no wrongful death cause of action for a 
viable, stillborn fetus.95  The court said that the wrongful death action is 
to be “strictly construed against the maintenance of any right of action 
not expressly provided for [in the act].”96  The court said that the use of 
the word person did not create an “ambiguity in our Wrongful Death 
Statute[,] [and] [w]e must consider it as it is written, not as we would 
have it.”97  The court also reasoned that because the statute had been 
amended without changes to include a cause of action for an unborn 
fetus, it presumed that the legislature approved of its earlier 
interpretation of the word person as it was used in the statute.98 
11.  Texas 
In Texas, the legislature amended the wrongful death act, changing 
the phrase “death of any person” to “an individual’s death.”99  The Texas 
 
 89. Id. at 904 (citations omitted). 
 90. Id. at 905. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Hamby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1977). 
 94. Durrett v. Owens, 371 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. 1963). 
 95. Hamby, 559 S.W.2d at 777. 
 96. Id. at 776. 
 97. Id. at 776 (quoting Hogan v. McDaniel, 319 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Tenn. 1958)). 
 98. Id.  The court also relied on its interpretation of the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  The Hamby court interpreted the Roe decision to say 
that the use of the word “person” in the Constitution had “no prenatal application.”  Hamby, 559 
S.W.2d at 777. 
 99. Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1987). 
10
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Supreme Court held that the substitution was not intended to create a 
substantive change, and it affirmed its earlier interpretation that the 
state’s wrongful death act did not create a cause of action unless there 
was a live birth.100  The court stated that although the statute is remedial, 
and should be liberally construed, the court “may not rewrite the statute 
in the guise of construing it.”101  The court said that it found no 
“evidence of legislative intent to include an unborn fetus within the 
scope of our Wrongful Death Act.”102 
12.  Utah 
Despite several opportunities, the Supreme Court of Utah has never 
directly decided whether a viable fetus is a person under the state’s 
wrongful death act.103  But it has never allowed recovery in a wrongful 
death claim for the death of a viable or pre-viable embryo or fetus.104  In 
1942, the Utah Supreme Court held that no damages could be awarded 
for the loss of an unborn child, but that the mother could recover 
damages for her injuries as a result of a miscarriage.105  Although the 
case did not discuss the gestational age of the fetus or embryo, because 
there was some dispute about whether the plaintiff was indeed pregnant 
at all, it is likely that it was not viable.106 
In 1975, the court evaluated a claim brought for the death of a full-
term, viable fetus who was stillborn.107  The court relied on the holding 
of a 1942 case,108 but it did not discuss whether the lower court erred in 
permitting the wrongful death cause of action, because the jury had not 
found the defendants liable, so no damages were awarded under that 
theory.109 
In 1996, the court evaluated a claim brought by the would-be 
grandparents of a fetus.110  Both the fetus and the plaintiffs’ pregnant, 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 505.  The court also held that there were no damages available under the state’s 
survival action.  Id. at 506.  The court stated that damages for the fetus’ medical and funeral could 
be recovered as a part of the mother’s damages.  Id.  And it found that any physical pain and 
suffering the fetus may have suffered were “far too speculative. . . . [and that] there is not even the 
possibility of proof to support the cause of action.”  Id. 
 103. See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 1942). 
 106. Id. at 118. 
 107. Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975). 
 108. Id. at 1077 (relying on Webb 132 P.2d at 114). 
 109. Id. 
 110. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1996). 
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minor daughter died as a result of a car accident.111 The court held that 
the grandparents had no standing to bring a wrongful death action for the 
death of the fetus because they were neither the parent nor the guardian 
of the fetus.112  The court did not decide whether the fetus was a person 
under the wrongful death act.113 
13.  Virginia 
In Virginia, there is no wrongful death action for the death of a 
viable fetus; the child must be born alive.114  In Lawrence v. Craven Tire 
Co., the court stated that it could not presume that the legislature 
intended the word person, as used in the wrongful death act, to mean 
anything more than the word’s common understanding.115  The court 
stated that in other statutes, the legislature had specifically extended the 
meaning of the word person, but it did not do so here.116 And because 
the legislature failed to specifically extend the meaning of the word, the 
court stated, “[w]e are unwilling to hold that a child En ventre sa mere 
can maintain a common law action for personal injuries.”117  Therefore, 
if the “decedent had no right . . . to maintain an action [because the 
viable fetus was not a person within the meaning of the wrongful death 
act] . . . then the right to maintain the present action could not be 
transmitted to her personal representative.”118 
14.  Wyoming 
There are no published cases addressing whether a viable or a 
previable fetus is a person under Wyoming’s wrongful death act.119  So it 
is unclear whether this jurisdiction would abandon the born-alive rule, 
but as yet, it has not done so. 
 
 111. Id. 1184-85. 
 112. Id. at 1186-87. 
 113. Id. at 1187 & n. 4. 
 114. Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Va. 1969).  The court applied the 
born-alive rule and permitted a cause of action for the death of a previable fetus, who was born alive 
at 21 weeks gestation, and who died approximately one and one half  hours later.  Kalafut v. Gruver, 
389 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1990) (explaining the reasoning of the Lawrence court). 
 115. Lawrence, 169 S.E.2d at 441. 
 116. Id. at  441-42. 
 117. Id. at 441. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Jill D. Washburn Helbling, To Recover or Not to Recover: A State By State Survey of 
Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 363, 429 (1996). 
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B.  Viability 
The majority of jurisdictions allow a wrongful death action to be 
maintained for the death of a viable fetus.120 
1.  Alabama 
In Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores,121 the Alabama Supreme Court first 
decided that there was a cause of action for the wrongful death of a 
viable fetus.122  The court stated that the “purpose of our wrongful death 
statute[] . . . is the preservation of human life.”123  The court reasoned 
that this purpose would be defeated if this cause of action was denied, so 
the court, “extending its judicial prerogative,”  recognized this cause of 
action.124 
But in Gentry v. Gilmore,125 the court held that there was no 
wrongful death cause of action for a stillborn, previable fetus.126  Here, 
the court first stated that no jurisdiction permitted a cause of action for a 
fetus of 13 weeks gestation.127  The court also recognized that, following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,128 the point of viability is 
one of significance.129  Therefore, the court held that a previable fetus 
was not a minor child under the applicable wrongful death act.130 
2.  Arizona 
In Summerfield v. Superior Court,131 the court held that a stillborn, 
viable fetus was a person under the state’s wrongful death act.132  The 
court began its analysis by examining “whether [it] was truly bound by 
legislative intent [in enacting the wrongful death act] or [was] free to 
apply a modicum of common law policy.”133  The court concluded that 
there was an uncertainty here as to whether Arizona recognized a 
 
 120. See infra notes 121-349 and accompanying text. 
 121. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974). 
 122. Id. at 355. 
 123. Id. at 356 (citations omitted). 
 124. Id. at 356, 357. 
 125. Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1993). 
 126. Id. at 1244. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 129. Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1244. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 724 (Ariz. 1985). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 715. 
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common law claim for a wrongful death.134  The court stated that, even if 
the legislature “believed that it was creating a new statutory right of 
action in enacting the Wrongful Death Act, there [was] no evidence to 
suggest that it intended to occupy the field completely,” so the court 
concluded that it could apply “common law attributes” in interpreting 
the wrongful death act.135 
The court stated that the legislature intended the wrongful death 
action to compensate survivors.136  Additionally, in other laws, the 
legislature had protected fetal life.137  So the court then reasoned that it 
was appropriate to allow this cause of action because it would 
compensate the fetus’s survivors and provide protection for fetal life.138 
The court did not find any conflict with the United States Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Roe because, it concluded, “[t]he word ‘person’ can 
mean different things in different contexts.”139  Further a woman’s right 
to choose is “very different” than the tortious termination of the 
pregnancy “against the mother’s will.”140 
Finally, the court stated that legislative inaction here should not be 
interpreted as an indication that the legislature intended to exclude a 
viable fetus under the wrongful death act.141 
3.  Arkansas 
In Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass’n, Inc.,142 the Arkansas Supreme 
Court overruled precedent143 and held that a viable, stillborn fetus was a 
person under the state’s wrongful death act.144  In its reasoning, the court 
reexamined its prior holding, where it had concluded that legislative 
action was required to make a viable fetus a person under the wrongful 
death act.145 
Therefore, in this case, the court looked for that legislative 
action.146  Although the Legislature had not amended the wrongful death 
 
 134. Id. at 716. 
 135. Id. at 717, 718. 
 136. Id. at 721. 
 137. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 721 (Ariz. 1985). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 722-23 (referring to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 724. 
 142. Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass’n Inc., 42 S.W.3d 508 (Ark. 2001). 
 143. Chatelain v. Kelley, 910 S.W.2d 215 (Ark. 1995). 
 144. Aka, 42 S.W.3d at 519. 
 145. Id. at 515. 
 146. Id. at 516. 
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act, in a criminal act, it had defined a person to include “an unborn child 
in utero at any stage of development.”147  Further, the court looked at 
public policy and found that the “people’s passage of Amendment 68 . . . 
declares that ‘[t]he policy of Arkansas is to protect the life of every 
unborn child from conception until birth.’”148  The court concluded that 
there was, therefore, sufficient reason to break from precedent, and that a 
viable fetus was a person under the state’s wrongful death act.149 
4.  Colorado 
In Espadero v. Feld,150 the court held that a viable fetus was a 
person within the meaning of Colorado’s wrongful death act.151  The 
court stated that it was likely that the state’s legislature “gave no 
thought” to whether the word person, as used in this statute, included a 
fetus.152  Therefore, the court looked to the legislature’s intent in 
enacting the wrongful death statute.153  The court concluded that the 
intent was to preserve and protect human life and that if it barred this 
claim, it would “frustrate the legislature’s intent.”154  Additionally, it 
would be inequitable to permit a cause of action for fetal injury suffered 
by a viable fetus, but deny a cause of action if that injury was so severe 
that it caused death.155  The court concluded, therefore, that there was a 
cause of action for the death of this full-term, viable fetus.156 
5.  Connecticut 
In Gorke v. Le Clerc,157 the court held that the estate of a stillborn, 
viable fetus could bring a cause of action for the wrongful death of this 
fetus.158  The court relied on two superior court decisions159 that had 
allowed recovery for fetal injuries when the child was later born alive.160  
 
 147. Id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102,(13)(B)(i)(Mitchie 1999)). 
 148. Id. at 517 (quoting ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 2). 
 149. Id. at 518. 
 150. Espadero v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Colo. 1986). 
 151. Id. at 1484. 
 152. Id. at 1483. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1484. 
 156. Espadero v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480, 1484 (D. Colo. 1986). 
 157. Gorke v. Le Clerc, 181 A.2d 448 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962). 
 158. Id. at 451. 
 159. Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 111 A.2d 14 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955) ; Prates v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 A.2d 633 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955). 
 160. Gorke, 181 A.2d at 451. 
15
Marks: Person v. Potential
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
MARKS2-CHRIS EXTRA.DOC 2/16/2004  11:01 AM 
56 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:41 
“Implicit in the principle that damages for non-fatal prenatal injuries to a 
viable fetus are recoverable is a recognition that there exists to such an 
unborn child a duty of care for the breach of which the wrongdoer may 
be held liable.”161  The court reasoned that because this fetus was 
capable of living independently at the time it was injured, it should make 
“no difference in liability whether the wrongfully inflicted injuries to the 
viable fetus result[ed] in death just prior to birth or in death just after 
birth.”162 
6.  Delaware 
In Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc.,163 the court held that the 
administrator for the estate of a stillborn, viable fetus could maintain a 
wrongful death cause of action.164  The court examined opinions from 
outside jurisdictions and noted that most had found that a viable fetus 
has a separate existence from its mother and, as such, was “entitled to 
sue either on its own behalf or through an administrator, depending upon 
whether it survived the accident.”165  Following these other jurisdictions, 
the court concluded that a wrongful death claim could be maintained in 
this case.166 
7.  Hawaii 
In Wade v. United States,167 the court held that a wrongful death 
cause of action could be maintained if a stillborn fetus was viable at the 
time of the death.168  Having no Hawaii cases on point, the court 
surveyed other jurisdictions and concluded that “principles of fairness 
and justice” required it to recognize a cause of action here because it 
would be unfair to permit a wrongful death cause of action for a child 
who died right after birth as a result of a prenatal injury, but deny a 
wrongful death cause of action on behalf of one who died just before his 
or her birth from the prenatal injury.169  The court further stated that it 
made no sense to deny this cause of action because it would only serve 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956). 
 164. Id. at 557. 
 165. Id. at 558. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Wade v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1573 (D. Haw. 1990). 
 168. Id. at 1579. 
 169. Id. 
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to immunize the tortfeasor from liability for causing the greater harm.170  
The court followed the majority of courts in other jurisdictions and held 
that, in its best estimate, the Hawaii Supreme Court would allow “a 
cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus who could have 
sustained life outside the womb,” and that it would “limit the cause of 
action to [the] wrongful death of a viable fetus only.”171 
8.  Idaho 
In Volk v. Baldazo,172 the Idaho Supreme Court held that there was 
a cause of action under the wrongful death act for the death of a 
stillborn, viable fetus.173  Here, the court began by stating that before the 
wrongful death act would apply, there must first be the right “to 
maintain an action for the injury” if the fetus had survived.174  The court 
recognized that the right to bring a cause of action for injury was “to be 
decided under the common law of torts and [it] is not controlled by 
legislative intent.”175  So, based on a majority of opinions from other 
jurisdictions, the court held that a cause of action for prenatal injuries 
was available to a viable fetus who was later born alive.176  Thus, this 
fetus would have had a cause of action for the injuries suffered if it had 
been born alive.177  Next, the court stated that the wrongful death act had 
two purposes: provide compensation and “deter wrongful conduct.”178  
The court then concluded that if it denied this cause of action, it would 
subvert these legislative purposes, so it permitted the cause of action.179 
In Santana v. Zilog, Inc.,180 the court held that there was no cause of 
action for the death of a previable fetus.181  Having no Idaho precedent 
to follow, the court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance.182  The 
court noted that most jurisdictions denied a wrongful death cause of 
action for a previable fetus.183  Although it recognized several reasons 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. In this case, the viability of the fetuses was at issue.  Id. at 1579-80. 
 172. Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982). 
 173. Id. at 15. 
 174. Id. at 13. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 14. 
 178. Volk, 651 P.2d at 15. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 783. 
 183. Id. 
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why other courts held this way, this court focused its analysis on the lack 
of “clear legislative direction.”184  The court stated that only five states 
had recognized this type of claim, and because only one of those did so 
without “action by the legislature,” this court reasoned that the Idaho 
courts would have denied this claim until they too had a clear directive 
from the Idaho legislature.185 
9.  Kansas 
In Hale v. Manion,186 the court, following precedent from outside 
jurisdictions, held that a stillborn, viable fetus was a person under the 
wrongful death act.187  The court found it unnecessary to set forth its 
specific reasons for doing so and, instead, referred the reader to 
scholarly discussions on the subject.188  But in Humes v. Clinton,189 
again following precedent from outside jurisdictions, the court held that 
there was no cause of action under the wrongful death act for the death 
of a previable fetus.190  The court reasoned that viability was necessary 
to maintain a wrongful death cause of action because “a nonviable fetus 
is not capable of living outside its mother’s womb,” so it “never 
bec[a]me an independent living person” who could have maintained a 
cause of action if death had not ensued.191  Further, the court stated that 
extending a cause of action to a previable fetus was a policy decision 
best left to the legislature.192 
10.  Kentucky 
In Mitchell v. Couch,193 the court held that a viable, stillborn fetus 
was a person within the meaning of the wrongful death act.194 The court 
stated that “a viable unborn child is an entity within the meaning of the 
general word ‘person’ . . . because, biologically speaking, such a child is, 
in fact, a presently existing person, a living human being.”195 
 
 184. Id. at 784. 
 185. Id.  at 784, 786. 
 186. Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan.1962). 
 187. Id. at 3. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032 (Kan. 1990). 
 190. Id. at 1037. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955). 
 194. Id. at 906. 
 195. Id. at 905. 
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11.  Maryland 
In State v. Sherman,196 the court held that there was a cause of 
action for the death of a viable fetus.197  The court, relying on a decision 
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland that recognized a child’s cause of 
action for injuries incurred prenatally,198 stated that it saw no reason why 
the cause of action “should be cut off because of the child’s death before 
birth” because, it stated, “[t]he cause of action arose at the time of the 
injury.”199 
And in Group Health Ass’n v. Blumenthal,200 the court held that a 
wrongful death cause of action could be maintained when a previable 
fetus was born alive.201 The court stated that “viability has no role in a 
case . . . where the child is born alive.”202  The court rejected the 
appellee’s argument that this cause of action should be barred by the 
United States Supreme Court ruling in Roe v. Wade.203 The court stated 
that recognizing a wrongful death cause of action did “not impinge on 
the [Supreme] Court’s decision in Roe” because the fact that the mother 
could have chosen to abort did “not lesson the alleged negligence 
leading to the child’s premature birth.”204 
But in Kandel v. White,205 the court did not extend the cause of 
action to include a stillborn, previable fetus.206  The court stated that 
there could be no wrongful death cause of action unless there was an 
“independent living person.”207  And because a previable stillborn fetus 
did not and could not live apart from its mother, no wrongful death 
action could be maintained.208 
12.  Massachusetts 
In Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,209 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held for the first time that a viable fetus was a person under the 
 
 196. State v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (Md. 1964). 
 197. Id. at 73. 
 198. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550 (Md. 1951). 
 199. Sherman, 198 A.2d at 73. 
 200. Group Health Ass’n v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198 (Md. 1983). 
 201. Id. at 1207. 
 202. Id. at 1206. 
 203. Id. at 1206 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 204. Id. at 1207. 
 205. Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264 (Md. 1995). 
 206. Id. at 1267. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1270 (quoting Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 136-37 (N.H. 1980)). 
 209. Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975). 
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state’s wrongful death act.210  Previously, the court had rejected the 
viability rule because it had no precedent to allow it; “it would be more 
appropriate for the Legislature to make such a change” and it would 
“subject the court to speculation and would not be easily administered 
under our statute.”211  But here, the court reasoned that because the 
majority of jurisdictions now allowed a cause of action when a fetus was 
viable, there was precedent to rely on.212  Further, the court stated that it 
also had precedent to alter its “interpretation of statutory language[] in 
an area now considered a part of the common law.”213  Finally, the court 
said that “the nature of damages recoverable cannot justify denying a 
right of action.”214  Therefore, the court concluded that it could find 
neither “reason nor logic” to deny a cause of action for the death of this 
viable fetus.215 
In Torigian v. Watertown News Co.,216 a previable fetus was born 
alive and died within a few hours.217  The court, stating that in “the vast 
majority of cases where the present issue has arisen, recovery has been 
allowed,” held that there was a cause of action under the wrongful death 
act.218 
Finally, in Thibert v. Milka,219 the court confirmed its two prior 
decisions, but refused to extend its interpretation of person to a previable 
fetus that was not born alive.220 The court reasoned that to have a cause 
of action, the fetus must have had a “separate existence” from its mother, 
but “ [w]here a nonviable fetus is stillborn, . . . the fetus could not have 
had an independent existence,” and “therefore, [there is] no separate 
cause of action for its death.”221 
13.  Minnesota 
In Verkennes v. Corniea,222 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held 
 
 210. Id. at 920. 
 211. Id. at 917. 
 212. Id. at 918. 
 213. Id. at 919.  To do so, the court relied on Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972), 
and Diaz v. Eli Lily & Co., 300 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. 1973). 
 214. Mone, 331 N.E. 2d at 919. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 927. 
 219. Thibert v. Milka , 646 N.E.2d. 1025 (Mass. 1995). 
 220. Id. at 1026. 
 221. Id. at 1027. 
 222. Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949). 
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that there was a wrongful death cause of action for a stillborn, viable 
fetus.223  As a novel issue in 1949, the court recognized that a majority 
of courts would not recognize this cause of action, so it looked to the 
writings of legal scholars and the reasoning used by courts permitting a 
cause of action for prenatal torts, and stated that “where independent 
existence is possible and life destroyed[,] . . . a cause of action arises.”224 
14.  Mississippi 
In Rainey v. Horn,225 the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a 
wrongful death cause of action was available for a stillborn, viable 
fetus.226  The court stated that “[w]hile the action in this case is a 
statutory one, . . . we look to the common law to determine the question 
before us.”227  The court reasoned that because a viable fetus was 
capable of an “independent existence from its mother,” it was “entitled 
to the protection of its person.”228 
15.  Montana 
In Strzelczyk v. Jett,229 the Supreme Court of Montana held that a 
viable fetus was a person under the state’s wrongful death act.230  Under 
a different statute, the court had previously denied a cause of action for a 
stillborn, viable fetus, finding that it was not a minor child under the 
applicable statute.231 In its interpretation of the present statute, the court 
then relied on the definition of an unborn child taken from another 
statute, which stated that “[a] child conceived but not yet born is . . . an 
existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event 
of its subsequent birth.”232  Based on this definition, the court concluded 
that a stillborn, viable fetus was also a person under the state’s wrongful 
death act.233 
Despite the Strzelczyk court’s reliance on this very broad definition 
 
 223. Id. at 841. 
 224. Id. at 840, 841. 
 225. Rainey v. Horn, 72 So.2d 434 (Miss. 1954). 
 226. Id. at 439-40. 
 227. Id. at 439. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Strzelczyk v. Jett, 870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1994). 
 230. Id. at 733. 
 231. Id. at 731.  In Kuhnke v. Fisher 683 P.2d 916, 919 (Mont. 1984), the court held that a 
stillborn, viable fetus was not a “minor child” under the wrongful death act. 
 232. Strzelczyk, 870 P.2d at 732 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 233. Id. at 733. 
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of an “existing person,”  the court later denied a cause of action for a 
previable fetus that was not born alive.234  In Blackburn v. Blue 
Mountain Women’s Clinic, the court, relying on its opinion in Kuhnke v. 
Fisher,235 concluded without discussion that there was no cause of action 
for the death of a previable fetus.236 
16.  Nevada 
In White v. Yup,237 the Nevada Supreme Court held that there was a 
wrongful death cause of action for the stillbirth of a viable fetus.238  
First, the court, following the majority of other jurisdictions,239 held that 
Nevada recognized a cause of action for prenatal injuries.240  Second, the 
court examined opinions from other jurisdictions and held, “based on the 
trend of modern authority,” that there was a cause of action for the death 
of a viable fetus.241 
17.  New Hampshire 
In Poliquin v. MacDonald,242 the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
held that “a fetus having reached that period of pre-natal maturity where 
it is capable of independent life apart from its mother is a person . . . 
[but] if a fetus is non-viable at the time of injury and dies in the womb 
its representative can maintain no action” under the wrongful death 
act.243  The court stated that because “[t]he common law ha[d] always 
been most solicitous for the welfare of the fetus in connection with its 
inheritance rights as well as protecting it under the criminal law, . . . a 
child [who] can live separate and apart from its mother” should be 
permitted to recover for prenatal injuries.244  And if it dies as a result of 
those injuries suffered prenatally while it was viable, “an action for 
 
 234. Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women’s Clinic, 951 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1997). 
 235. Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916, 919 (Mont. 1984). 
 236. Blackburn, 951 P.2d at 6.  It should be noted that it was a viable fetus that died in Kuhnke, 
and according to this court’s opinion in Strzelczyk v. Jett, the statutory basis for the claim brought in 
Kuhnke was amended in 1987.  Strzelczyk, 870 P.2d at 732. 
 237. White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969). 
 238. Id. at 623-24. 
 239. The court did not specify its basis for the holding other than the weight of authority.  Id. at 
621. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 623. 
 242. Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249 (N.H. 1957). 
 243. Id. at 251 (citations omitted). 
 244. Id. 
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recovery may be maintained on its behalf.”245 
But in Wallace v. Wallace,246 the court held that there was no 
wrongful death claim available for a stillborn, previable fetus.247  The 
court stated that the question it had to answer was not “when life begins” 
but when the court should recognize a cause of action.248  “It is simply a 
policy determination that the law will not extend civil liability by giving 
a nonviable fetus a cause of action for negligence before it becomes a 
person . . . .”249  “In other words, life may begin with conception, but 
causes of action do not.”250 
18.  New Mexico 
In Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital,251 the court held that a viable 
fetus was a person under the state’s wrongful death act.252  The court, 
rather than relying on a common-law argument, evaluated the state’s 
criminal statutes in effect at the time that the wrongful death act was 
created.253  The court stated that because a viable fetus was protected “in 
legislation which dealt with offenses against ‘lives and persons,’” the 
legislature intended for a viable fetus to be “protected by legislation 
dealing with lives and persons.”254 
In 1995, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a previable fetus 
who was born alive was not a person under the state’s wrongful death 
act.255  “On this issue, we find no clear legislative directive.”256  
Therefore, relying on persuasive precedent, the court held that “[a] 
nonviable fetus is incapable of living outside its mother’s womb and 
cannot be regarded as a separate entity capable of maintaining an 
independent action in its own right.”257  The court reasoned that absent a 
directive from the legislature, “we consider it sound statutory 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134 (N.H. 1980). 
 247. Id. at 137. 
 248. Id. at 136. 
 249. Id.  The court said that legislative inaction should not be considered, and it noted that “it 
would be incongruous for a mother to have . . . [the] right to deliberately destroy a nonviable fetus 
and at the same time for a third person to be subject to liability . . . [for] negligent acts.”  Id. at 137 
(citations omitted). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital, 619 P.2d 826 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). 
 252. Id. at 830. 
 253. Id. at 829-30. 
 254. Id. at 830. 
 255. Miller v. Kirk, 905 P.2d 194 (N.M. 1995). 
 256. Id. at 195. 
 257. Id. at 197. 
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interpretation to limit the right to maintain an action to a viable fetus.”258 
19.  North Carolina 
In 1987, overruling two court of appeals opinions, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court held that a viable fetus was a person under the 
state’s wrongful death act.259  Although the legislature had not amended 
the statute since the prior decisions, the court stated that its inaction and 
silence did not imply its approval.260  The court stated that, therefore, 
there was no apparent legislative intent, and it turned to the plain 
meaning of the statute.261  The court again concluded that the words used 
provided no “clear-cut answer” to whether a viable fetus was a person, 
so it turned to common law claims for injuries to fetuses.262  “It would be 
logical and consistent with these decisions, and would further the policy 
of deterring dangerous conduct that underlies them, to allow such claims 
when the fetus does not survive.”263  Further, the court analyzed the 
recent legislative revision in another statute that stated that “human life 
is inherently valuable,”264 and it concluded that a wrongful death action 
should be allowed here.265  Despite reaching this conclusion, the court 
limited the damages available in the action, specifically excluding as too 
speculative damages for lost income, loss of services, and loss of society 
and companionship.266 
20.  North Dakota 
When the North Dakota Supreme Court heard Hopkins v. 
McBane,267 a wrongful death claim, it had not yet decided whether it 
would allow a cause of action for prenatal torts if the child was later 
born alive.268  Here, the court concluded that it would allow both 
claims.269  In its reasoning, the court relied on the “nearly unanimous 
 
 258. Id. 
 259. DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987) (overruling Yow v. Nance, 224 
S.E.2d 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976); Cardwell v. Welch, 213 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975)). 
 260. Id. at 490. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 491-92. 
 263. Id. at 491. 
 264. Id. (quoting N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-2). 
 265. Id. at 493-94. 
 266. Id.  at 494. 
 267. Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984). The case was heard again by the court 
in 1988 on procedural and damages issues.  Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1988). 
 268. Hopkins, 359 N.W.2d at 864. 
 269. Id.  at 864, 865. 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss1/2
MARKS2-CHRIS EXTRA.DOC 2/16/2004  11:01 AM 
2004] PERSON V. POTENTIAL 65 
weight of authority” and recognized without discussion that it would 
permit a cause of action for a prenatal tort if it was followed by a live 
birth.270  After settling that issue, the court, attempting to determine 
legislative intent in the wrongful death statute, looked to a different 
statute, which provided a definition of when an unborn child was to be 
deemed a person.271  The court stated that the legislative intent in that 
statute was to “ensure and to protect the interests of a child subsequent 
to its conception but prior to it birth.”272  The court then extended the 
legislative intent expressed in that statute to the applicable wrongful 
death statute, and it held that it should recognize a cause of action for the 
wrongful death of a stillborn, viable fetus.273 
21.  Ohio 
In Werling v. Sandy,274 the Ohio Supreme Court held for the first 
time that there was a wrongful death action brought on behalf of a 
stillborn, viable fetus.275  Ohio had already recognized that a child born 
alive could bring a cause of action for injuries he or she suffered 
prenatally.276  Thus, the court stated that to deny this claim would only 
benefit the tortfeasor for causing the greater harm of death.277  And it 
would thwart the remedial nature of the wrongful death act.278  The court 
also stated that its decision was consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Roe v. Wade279  because the line of 
demarcation here, like in Roe, was viability.280 
In 1993, an Ohio court of appeals was asked to recognize a cause of 
action for the stillbirth of previable fetus.281  The plaintiff requested that 
the court adopt the “quickness” test used in Georgia.282  Although the 
court of appeals seemed motivated to accept the plaintiff’s argument, it 
left the decision to its state supreme court, and it denied the cause of 
 
 270. Id. at 864. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 865. 
 274. Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985). 
 275. Id. at 1056. 
 276. Id. at 1055. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 280. Werling, 476 N.E. 2d at 1056. 
 281. Egan v. Smith, 622 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
 282. Id. at 1193.  See infra notes 354-57 and accompanying text. 
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action.283 
22.  Oklahoma 
In Evans v. Olson,284 the Oklahoma Supreme Court overruled its 
previous decisions285 and held there was a wrongful death cause of 
action for the stillbirth of a viable fetus.286  The court stated that a 
wrongful death cause of action could be maintained if the decedent 
would have had a right to bring an action if he or she had survived the 
injury.287  The court then reasoned that because a child who was later 
born alive could bring a claim for injuries suffered prenatally, a cause of 
action could also be maintained by the fetus’s estate in a wrongful death 
claim.288 
In Guyer v. Hugo Publishing Co.,289 the court held that there was no 
wrongful death cause of action for the miscarriage of a previable 
fetus.290  The court stated that binding case law still compelled it to 
exclude this cause of action under the wrongful death act because 
Evans291 only changed case law regarding viable fetuses.292  Therefore, it 
was bound to hold that there was no wrongful death cause of action for a 
miscarried, previable fetus.293 
But in Nealis v. Baird,294 the court held that a born alive, previable 
fetus was “one” under the wrongful death act.295  The court stated that a 
live birth conveyed legal status to the previable fetus, even if he was 
unable to sustain life.296  The court found no conflict between this 
holding and a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion because 
“[w]here both the state and the mother have identical interests in 
 
 283. Egan, 622 N.E.2d at 1193-94.  The court stated: “[T]here is . . . no reason why the State’s 
compelling interest in protecting human life should not extend throughout pregnancy rather than 
coming into existence only at the point of viability.”  Id. at 1194 (quoting Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 494 (1989)). 
 284. Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976). 
 285. Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953); Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 
1967). 
 286. Evans, 550 P.2d at 925. 
 287. Id. at 927. 
 288. Id. at 927-28. 
 289. Guyer v. Hugo Publishing Co., 830 P.2d 1393 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991). 
 290. Id.  at 1394. 
 291. Evans, 550 P.2d at 924. 
 292. Guyer, 830 P.2d at 1394. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Nealis v. Baird, 996 P.2d 438, 455 (Okla. 1999). 
 295. Id. at 452-53. 
 296. Id. at 453, 454. 
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preserving the child’s life and in vindicating harm resulting in its death, 
Roe poses no legal obstacle.”297 
23.  Oregon 
In Libbee v. Permanente Clinic,298 the court, following the majority 
of other jurisdictions, held that there was a wrongful death cause of 
action for the death of a stillborn, viable fetus.299  The court also stated 
that this holding was consistent with its previous holding300 that a child 
later born alive could recover for injuries suffered prenatally, at least 
when the child was viable at the time the injury occurred.301  Further, the 
court stated that its position was consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,302 because it too was relying 
on viability to create the cause of action here.303 
In LaDu v. Oregon Clinic., P.C.,304 an Oregon court of appeals, en 
banc, held that a previable fetus was not a person under the Oregon 
wrongful death act.305  In interpreting the word “person” used in the act, 
the court stated that the plain meaning of the word at the time the statute 
was enacted did not include a previable fetus.306  Further, even under 
statutes that allow an unborn to inherit a share of an estate, it must still 
be born alive before it inherits, so the rights conferred to the unborn 
under these statutes did not lead the court to conclude that the legislature 
intended the word person to include a previable fetus.307  Finally, the 
court examined the anti-abortion statute in effect when the wrongful 
death act was created, but it found no contextual relevance.308  
Therefore, the court concluded that the wrongful death statute did not 
provide a cause of action for the death of a previable fetus.309 
 
 297. Id. at 455. 
 298. Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636 (Or. 1974). 
 299. Id. at 640. 
 300. Mallison v. Pomeroy, 291 P.2d 225 (Or. 1955). 
 301. Libbee, 518 P.2d at 639. 
 302. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 303. Libbee, 518 P.2d at 640. 
 304. LaDu v. Oregon Clinic., P.C., 998 P.2d 733 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). 
 305. Id. at 738. 
 306. Id. at 735. 
 307. Id. at 736. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
27
Marks: Person v. Potential
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
MARKS2-CHRIS EXTRA.DOC 2/16/2004  11:01 AM 
68 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:41 
24.  Pennsylvania 
In Amadio v. Levin,310 a divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
for the first time that there was a wrongful death cause of action for the 
stillbirth of a viable fetus.311  In very broad language, the majority 
opinion stated that it had “acknowledge[d] a child en ventre sa mere to 
be an ‘individual,’ ‘having existence as a separate creature from the 
moment of conception.’”312 The court stated that it would “[n]o longer 
sanction a legal doctrine that enables a tortfeasor who causes death to 
escape full liability.”313 
But in Coveleski v. Bubnis,314 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
that there was no cause of action for the death of a previable fetus.315  
The court, relying on cases from other jurisdictions, rejected the claim 
and stated that it would wait for legislative direction before expanding 
the cause of action to a previable fetus.316  Thus, the court stated that in 
Pennsylvania the death of a fetus could be the basis for a wrongful death 
claim only if the fetus was born alive or if the fetus was “capable of an 
independent existence at the time of death.”317 
25.  Rhode Island 
In Presley v. Newport Hospital,318 the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
first considered whether a cause of action for the death of a viable fetus 
could be brought under the state’s wrongful death act.319  Here, the court 
held that it could.320  The court reasoned that because it recognized a 
cause of action for prenatal injuries, it found no “perceptible reason why 
there should be a legally recognized difference between a death that 
occurs immediately before birth and one that occurs immediately 
after.”321  Additionally, the court said that “it makes poor sense to 
sanction a legal doctrine that enables the tortfeasor whose deed brings 
 
 310. Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985). 
 311. Id. at 1089. 
 312. Id. at 1087. 
 313. Id. at 1088. 
 314. Coveleski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1993). 
 315. Id. at 610. 
 316. Id. The court pointed out that the Illinois legislature had done just that.  Id. 
 317. Id.  See also Hudak v. Georgy, 634 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1993) (holding that there was a cause of 
action under the wrongful death act for triplets that were previable at the time of birth, but who were 
born alive and survived for a short period of time). 
 318. Presley v. Newport Hospital, 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976). 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 754. 
 321. Id. at 753. 
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about a stillbirth to escape liability but that renders one whose 
wrongdoing is less severe answerable . . . because his victim survives 
birth.”322  Although it was, obviously, not necessary in this case, the 
court stated that “the decedent, whether viable or nonviable, was a 
‘person’ within the meaning of the Wrongful Death Act.”323 
Although this clear statement would imply that the court was not 
requiring that the fetus be viable,324 in Miccolis v. Amica Mut. Ins., 
Co.,325 the court held that a previable fetus was not a person under the 
Wrongful Death Act.326  There the court stated: 
[T]he overwhelming majority view in this country is that a nonviable 
fetus has no right to bring an action for wrongful death. . . . The 
language of the plurality opinion of Presley . . . is merely dictum and 
has no precedential value, . . . [and] [w]e do not believe that the 
Legislature intended a nonviable fetus to be defined as a “person” 
within the meaning of the wrongful-death statute.327 
26.  South Carolina 
In Fowler v. Woodward,328 the court held that a stillborn, viable 
fetus was a person under the wrongful death act.  The court relied on its 
previous decision in a prenatal tort case where the child was later born 
alive, which stated that a fetus “capable of independent life apart from 
its mother is a person.”329  The court reasoned that if it is a person for 
purposes of bringing a prenatal injury claim after birth, it is a person 
entitled to “maintain an action . . . if death had not ensued,” as required 
under the state’s wrongful death act.330  The court concluded that the 
death of a viable fetus fulfilled all the requirements set out in the 
wrongful death act.331 
But in Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co.,332 the court held that 
there was no cause of action for a stillborn, previable fetus.333  
 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 754. 
 324. In fact, the court stated that it was disregarding the allegation of viability.  Id. 
 325. Miccolis v. Amica Mut. Ins., Co., 587 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1991). 
 326. Id. at 71. 
 327. Id. (citations omitted). 
 328. Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, 45 (S.C. 1964). 
 329. Id. at 44 (quoting Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (S.C. 1960)) (emphasis in the 
original). 
 330. Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (Law Co-Op 1962)). 
 331. Id. 
 332. Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 532 S.E.2d 856 (S.C. 2000). 
 333. Id. at 857. 
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Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, this court reasoned that 
only by legislative action could it extend a wrongful death action to 
include a previable fetus.334  In dictum, and in response to a dissenting 
opinion, the court stated that if this fetus had been born alive, that alone 
was evidence that it was viable because it lived independent from its 
mother.335 
27.  Vermont 
In Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc., 336 the 
Vermont Supreme Court first held that a stillborn, viable fetus was a 
person under the wrongful death act.337  The court recognized that there 
was a split in authority, but it reasoned that the cause of action should be 
recognized because once a fetus reached viability, there was no reason to 
permit a cause of action if the death occurred just after birth, but to deny 
it if it occurred just before birth.338  Further, after viability, the fetus was 
a “presently existing person” because it had the ability to survive 
separately from its mother.339  Finally, the court recognized that to deny 
this claim would permit the tortfeasor to benefit from the greater harm 
caused (death), when the tortfeasor would be liable for the lesser harm 
(injury) caused to a fetus at this stage of development.340 
28.  Washington 
In Moen v. Hanson,341 the en banc Washington Supreme Court, 
analyzing a claim for the wrongful death of a stillborn, viable fetus, first 
acknowledged that this was being brought as a wrongful death action, 
and not as a survival action.342  The court held that this fetus was a minor 
child within the meaning of the state’s wrongful death act.343  The court 
stated that there was no “lower age limitation . . . implied” by the term 
minor child used to create this cause of action, which was enacted for the 
 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980). 
 337. Id. at 94-95. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. (quoting White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617, 622 (Nev. 1969)). 
 340. Id. at 94-95. 
 341. Moen v. Hanson, 537 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975). 
 342. Id. at 266.  A Washington court of appeals held that a stillborn, viable fetus was also a 
person under the state’s survival statute in Cavazos v. Franklin, 867 P.2d 674 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1994). 
 343. Moen, 537 P.2d at 268. 
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benefit of the parents.344  Further, it stated that most jurisdictions have 
recognized this cause of action for a viable fetus and that problems that 
may arise related to causation and damages should not prevent the cause 
of action.345 
29.  Wisconsin 
In Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,346 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a stillborn, viable fetus was a person 
under the state’s wrongful death act.347  The court, finding that most 
jurisdictions would recognize this cause of action,348 stated that there 
were four reasons to allow recovery here.  (1) “A viable child is capable 
of independent existence and therefore should be recognized as a 
separate entity entitled to the protection of the law.” (2) An unborn child 
is protected under other laws.  (3) To deny the claim would be to allow 
the tortfeasor to benefit from causing the greater harm, as a cause of 
action for injuries only would have been available.  (4) The family has 
suffered a loss even if the fetus dies before it is born.349 
C.  Previability - No Live Birth Requirement 
A clear minority of six (arguably seven)350 jurisdictions provide a 
cause of action for the wrongful death of an embryo or previable fetus.351  
Of the six, five permit the cause of action at any point during 
gestation.352  Georgia alone uses “quickening” as the point when a 
wrongful death action is recognized.353 
1.  Georgia 
In Porter v. Lassiter,354 the statutory basis for the claim raised 
provided that a parent could “recover for the homicide of a child.”355  
 
 344. Id. at 267. 
 345. Id. at 267-68. 
 346. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W. 2d 107 (Wis. 1967). 
 347. Id. at 111-12. 
 348. Id. at 110. 
 349. Id. at 110-11. 
 350. Michigan’s case and codified law are discussed separately in Section IV.  See infra notes 
386-439 and accompanying text. 
 351. See infra notes 354-85 and accompanying text. 
 352. See infra notes 358-85 and accompanying text. 
 353. See infra notes 354-57 and accompanying text. 
 354. Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) 
 355. Id. at 102 (citation to statute omitted). 
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The court started its analysis by stating that under Georgia’s criminal 
laws, the killing of a “quick” child was murder, while the killing of a 
child before “quickening” was only a misdemeanor.356  Based on this 
distinction and the words of the statute creating the cause of action here, 
the court held that there could be no cause of action for the death of a 
fetus before it was “quick.”357 
2.  Illinois 
An Illinois statute provides, “The state of gestation or development 
of a human being . . . at death, shall not foreclose maintenance of any 
cause of action . . . arising from the death of a human being caused by 
wrongful act, neglect, or default.”358  In Seef v. Sutkus,359 the fetus was 
stillborn at 38-weeks gestational age.360  The court there held that loss of 
society damages were appropriate because the statute defined this fetus 
as a person, and under Illinois law, loss of society damages were 
appropriate pecuniary damages under the wrongful death act.361 
3.  Louisiana 
In Danos v. St. Pierre,362 the Louisiana Supreme Court first held 
that there was no cause of action for the death of a six or seven month 
gestational age fetus, but on rehearing, a divided court held that there 
was.363  The court stated that to bar this cause of action would “benefit 
the tortfeasor who causes a more serious injury, since the tortfeasor 
would have to pay damages if his fault cause[d] a child to be born 
disabled, but would not have to pay any damages if his fault cause[d] 
prenatal death.”364  The court also relied on a “recent legislative 
pronouncement . . . that a human being exists from the moment of 
fertilization and implantation.”365  Finally, the court stated “We believe 
the infant is a child from the moment of its conception . . . and that the 
injury or killing of it, in its mother’s womb, is covered by the statute . . . 
 
 356. The court defined a quick unborn child as one who is “so far developed as to move or stir 
in the nother’s wonb.”  Id. (citations omitted.) 
 357. Id. at 103. 
 358. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2.2 (1989). 
 359. Seef v. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. 1991). 
 360. Id. at 511. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So.2d 633 (La.1981). 
 363. Id. at 639. 
 364. Id. at 638. 
 365. Id. 
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giv[ing] the bereaved parents a right of action against the guilty parties 
for their grief, and mental anguish.”366 
4.  Missouri 
In Missouri, a state constitutional provision requires that “[t]he laws 
of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf 
of the unborn child at every stage of development, all rights, privileges 
and immunities available to other persons.”367  Applying this 
constitutional provision to the state’s wrongful death statute, the 
Missouri Supreme Court stated: “[W]e cannot avoid the conclusion that 
the legislature intended the courts to interpret ‘person’ within the 
wrongful death statute to allow a natural parent to state a claim for the 
wrongful death of his or her unborn child, even prior to viability.”368 
5.  South Dakota 
In South Dakota, there is a cause of action “[w]henever the death or 
injury of a person, including an unborn child, shall be caused by a 
wrongful act.”369  In Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms,370 the wrongful 
death claim involved a fetus of seven-weeks gestational age.371  The 
court held that the language of the statute provided a cause of action for 
the death of this previable fetus.372  The court reasoned that because the 
legislature had added the words “including an unborn child” to the 
statute in 1984, it intended to expand “the class of persons covered by 
the statute” beyond those born alive and viable fetuses.373  Further, the 
court reasoned that when the words of a statute are clear, like the word 
unborn here, it was confined to interpret those words according to their 
plain meaning.374  And the court stated that this interpretation created no 
constitutional issue regarding a woman’s right to abortion because “[a] 
choice to abort sanctions a mother’s decision, not someone else’s.”375 
 
 366. Id. at 639 (quoting Johnson v. South N.O. Lt. & Traction, Co., No. 9,048 (Orl. App. 1923) 
cert. den. No. 26,443 (La. 1924)). 
 367. MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1969). 
 368. Connor v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). 
 369. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (Mitchie 1984). 
 370. Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W. 2d 787 (S.D. 1996). 
 371. Id. at 789. 
 372. Id. at 791. 
 373. Id. at 790. 
 374. Id.  at 790-91. 
 375. Id. at 791. 
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6.  West Virginia 
In West Virginia, the term person, as used in the wrongful death 
act, encompasses a previable embryo or fetus.376  In Farley v. Sartin,377 
plaintiff’s pregnant wife was killed in an auto accident.378 At the time of 
the accident, she was 18-22 weeks pregnant.379  The court held that the 
plaintiff could maintain a cause of action for the death of the previable 
fetus under the state’s wrongful death action.380The court began 
analyzing the claim by reviewing the purpose of the wrongful death act 
and cases addressing liability for injuries suffered prenatally.381  The 
court reasoned that because the wrongful death act was intended to 
prevent a tortfeasor from escaping “all liability when the injuries were 
severe enough to kill the victim[],”382 and because a child who was later 
born alive could recover for an injury suffered previability,383 if it did 
not permit a wrongful death cause of action for a previable fetus, then it 
would defeat the intended purpose of the wrongful death act.384  “In our 
judgment, justice is denied when a tortfeasor is permitted to walk away 
with impunity because of the happenstance that the unborn child had not 
yet reached viability at the time of death.”385 
IV.  WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION FOR AN UNBORN EMBRYO OR FETUS IN 
MICHIGAN 
A.  Historically 
In 1894, the Michigan Supreme Court first considered whether 
damages were available for the death of an unborn embryo or fetus.386 
The lower court had permitted the jury to award damages to the mother 
for the loss of “society, enjoyment, and prospective services” of the 
unborn embryo or fetus.387  The court reasoned that it “would not be 
 
 376. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 523 (W.Va. 1995). 
 377. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 522. 
 378. Id. at 523. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. at 525-29. 
 382. Id. at 525. 
 383. Id. at 528. 
 384. Id. at 533-34. 
 385. Id. at 533. 
 386. Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Consol. Ry. Co., 61 N.W. 11 (Mich. 1894).  The court did not 
discuss the gestational age of this embryo or fetus. See id. 
 387. Id.  at 12. 
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competent for the jury to . . . attempt to compensate for the sorrow and 
grieving of the mother,”388  and the court discussed the speculative 
nature of the damages.389  But the court did state that the mother’s own 
physical pain and mental suffering was compensable, which “involv[ed] 
to some extent a consideration of the nature of the injury, and cannot 
exclude from the consideration . . . [the] mental suffering of the mother 
by reason of such an injury [which] would be more intense than in the 
case of the ordinary fracture of a limb.”390 
In a 1968 plurality opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a 
viable fetus was not a person under the wrongful death statute.391  In the 
main opinion, the court stated that, because the statute was unambiguous 
and in derogation of the common law, it was constrained to interpret it as 
it was written.392 
In 1971, in O’Neill v. Morse, the Michigan Supreme Court 
overruled its 1968 plurality decision.393  The court held that there was a 
claim under the wrongful death statute for the death of an unborn viable 
fetus.394  In its reasoning, the court began with its recent decision where 
it allowed an eight-year-old child to recover for injuries he suffered 
prenatally.395  The court then stated that because there was a cause of 
action for prenatal injuries, and because the wrongful death act was 
intended to preserve an action that the decedent could have brought if he 
or she had lived, it should permit this wrongful death cause of action for 
the injuries suffered by this viable, unborn fetus.396  The court also 
refuted similar contrary reasoning from Powers v. City of Troy, that an 
unborn fetus was not a person.397  The O’Neill court stated that birth 
cannot be the point at which we measure where life begins because “[a] 
 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Powers v. City of Troy, 156 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 1968). 
 392. Id. (citing Hogan v. McDaniel, 319 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Tenn. 1958)). 
 393. O’Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971). 
 394. Id. at 788. 
 395. Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971). 
 396. O’Neill, 188 N.W.2d at 786.  Interestingly, if this reasoning was followed to its logical 
conclusion, this case would create a cause of action for the death of a previable unborn as well 
because, in Womack, the child was injured at four months gestational age. Womack, 187 N.W.2d at 
219.  Thus, he was injured previability and allowed to recover. Id. at 222.  Therefore, based on the 
O’Neill court’s reasoning, if death occurred as a result of an injury suffered previability, the 
wrongful death cause of action should be preserved under the common law rule of tort recovery 
permitted in O’Neill.  Cf. Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1994) (extending a cause of action for wrongful death for a viable fetus who died in utero as a 
result of a surgical procedure performed on the mother before the fetus’s conception). 
 397. O’Neil, 188 N.W.2d at 786-88. 
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fetus having died within its mother’s womb . . . will not come alive 
when separated from her.  [And] a fetus living within the mother’s 
womb . . . will not die when separated from her, unless the manner, the 
time[,] or the circumstances of separation constitute a fatal trauma.”398 
In Toth v. Goree,399 a fetus of three months gestational age was 
miscarried as a result of a car accident.400  The court held that a wrongful 
death cause of action could not be maintained because the fetus was not 
a person under the law.401  The court began its analysis by revisiting two 
Michigan Supreme Court decisions: one that permitted an eight-year-old 
child to recover for a prenatal injury suffered previability (Womack),402 
and one that permitted a wrongful death cause of action of the death of a 
viable fetus (O’Neill).403  The Toth court concluded that the ruling in 
Womack was limited only to prenatal claims suffered previability that 
were later brought by a child who was born alive,404 and that the ruling 
in the O’Neill was limited only to the death of a viable fetuses.405  The 
court also evaluated this claim in light of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Roe v. Wade.406  The court reasoned that, in light of Roe v. Wade, “[i]f 
the mother can intentionally terminate the pregnancy at three months, 
without regard to the rights of the fetus, it becomes increasingly difficult 
to justify holding a third person liable to the fetus for unknowingly and 
unintentionally, but negligently, causing the pregnancy to end at that 
same stage.”407  Finally, the court stated that because no other 
jurisdiction had permitted a wrongful death cause of action on behalf of 
a three-month gestational age, previable fetus, it could not find a basis to 
permit one here without legislative action.408 
In Jarvis v. Providence Hospital,409 the unborn fetus’ mother was 
 
 398. Id. at 787. 
 399. Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975). 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. at 302.  See also Carter v. Hutzel Hosp., 1997 WL 33344935, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Aug. 26, 1997) (confirming that “[t]he wrongful death act does not create a cause of action for a 
nonviable fetus not born alive”). 
 402. Id. at 300 (discussing Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971)). 
 403. Id. (discussing O’Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971)). 
 404. Id.  “The only issue in this case [Womack]  is whether a common-law negligence action 
can be brought on behalf of a surviving child negligently injured during the fourth month of 
pregnancy.”  Id. (quoting Womack, 187 N.W.2d at 219) (emphasis added). 
 405. Toth, 237 N.W.2d at 302.  The court in Toth stated, “[w]hile much of the language in 
O’Neill is ambiguous as regards viability, it does tend to exclude the nonviable fetus from its 
discussion.”  Id. at 300-01. 
 406. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 407. Toth, 237 N.W.2d at 303-04. 
 408. Id. at 302. 
 409. Jarvis v. Providence Hospital, 444 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
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exposed to hepatitis when the fetus was three and one-half months 
gestational age.410  When the fetus was of eight months gestational age, 
the mother contracted hepatitis, and the unborn fetus died as a result.411  
The court found that because the fetus was viable at the time of the 
death, the timing of the injury causing event was irrelevant, and the court 
held that there was a claim under the wrongful death act for this fetus’ 
death.412 
A Michigan court again revisited the issue of whether there was a 
wrongful death cause of action for a previable fetus in Fryover v. 
Forbes.413  In Fryover, the court summarily overruled the appellate 
court’s holding that a wrongful death action was available for the death 
of an unborn fetus of 16-weeks gestational age.414  The court, stated that 
there was no legislative intent to “create a cause of action for a 
nonviable fetus not born alive.”415 
Despite the court’s statement in Fryover, which seemed to indicate 
that either viability or live birth was required, in McDowell v. Stubbs416 
the court stated that viability was required before there was a cause of 
action for the death of a fetus.417  In McDowell, twin fetuses were 
delivered at approximately 20 weeks gestation.418  The fetuses had heart 
rates at one and five minutes after delivery, respectively.419  One twin 
had some spontaneous movement.420  Hospital records indicated that the 
twins were “liveborn.”421  The twins were not viable at the time of their 
birth because of their gestational age.422  Because the twins were born 
alive, the appellate court reasoned that there was no additional 
requirement that they also be viable.423  But the Michigan Supreme 
Court summarily reversed the judgment of the court of appeals,424 
 
 410. Id. at 237. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. at 238-39. 
 413. Fryover v. Forbes, 446 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 1989). 
 414. Fryover v. Forbes, 439 N.W.2d 284 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d, 446 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 
1989). 
 415. Fryover, 446 N.W.2d at 292. 
 416. Estate of McDowell v. Stubbs, 564 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1997). 
 417. Id. 
 418. Estate of McDowell v. Stubbs, 553 N.W.2d 634, 635 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), rev’d, 564 
N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1997). 
 419. Id. at 635-36. 
 420. Id. at 636. 
 421. Id. at 635. 
 422. Id. at 636. 
 423. Id. at 637-38. 
 424. McDowell, 564 N.W.2d at 463. 
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without discussing the fact that the twins had been born alive.425  
Instead, the court, relying on the decision in Toth v. Goree,426 which held 
that there was no cause of action for the death of a previable fetus that 
had not been born alive, focused solely on the fact that the McDowell 
twins were previable at the time that they were born alive, and it decided 
that there was no cause of action under the wrongful death act.427  In his 
dissent, Justice Cavanagh pointed out that Michigan followed the born-
alive rule in criminal cases, and that the Toth court had not departed 
from the born-alive rule in its decision.428 
B.  1999 Amendatory Act 
1.  History 
On March 19, 1997, House Bill No. 4524 was introduced.429  The bill 
proposed an amendment to Michigan’s wrongful death act, by providing 
a remedy for the death of “an individual,” and defining the term 
“individual” to include “the live unborn offspring of a human being at 
any time or stage of development from conception to birth.”430  The 
legislature also added 600.2922a, which would have codified the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Womack. 431 Under this proposed 
amendment, the personal representative for the estate of the unborn 
embryo or previable fetus had the same right of recovery under the 
wrongful death act as was available in the event of the death of a viable 
 
 425. Id. 
 426. Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297 (Mich Ct. App 1975). 
 427. McDowell, 564 N.W.2d at 463. 
 428. Id. 
 429. H.B. 4524, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997). 
 430. Id.  The amendment would have changed the words “a person” to “an individual.”  Id.  
House Leg. Analysis, H.B. 4524, April 18, 1992.  Both the bill as first proposed and the statute in its 
final form indicate that this is an “amendatory act.”  H.B. 4524.  Although the final form of the 1999 
law does not specifically state this it is amending the general wrongful death act, it need not do so to 
accomplish that change.  See People ex rel. Harrington v. Wands, 23 Mich. 385 (1871); Lucas v. 
Bd. of Co. Rd. Comm’rs, 348 N.W.2d 670-71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that “amendment by 
implication is permitted without republishing or reenacting every previous statute affected by the 
new law”). 
 431. Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971) (holding that a child who was 
negligently injured prenatally could bring a cause of action against the tortfeasor).  The original 
wording of section 600.2922a of House Bill 4524 stated, “A person who wrongfully or negligently 
causes injury to an unborn child is liable for damages.  As used in this section, ‘unborn child’ means 
the live unborn offspring of a human being at any time or stage of development from conception 
until birth.”  H.B. 4524, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997). 
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fetus or a person born alive, including the decedent’s pain and 
suffering.432 
By May 1998, all amendments proposed by House Bill No. 4524 
were contained in 600.2922a.433  This substituted bill, passed by the 
House on May 27, 1998, and by the Senate on June 10, 1998, imposed 
liability on a tortfeasor for a wrongful or negligent act “against a 
pregnant individual” resulting “in a miscarriage or stillbirth . . . or 
physical injury to the embryo or fetus.”434 The new law took effect 
January 1, 1999.435 
A bill analysis published after the law was enacted stated that 
before the law went into effect, there may have been no way “for the 
[pregnant] woman or her family to secure civil” relief for these damages 
because “the [current] law allow[ed] wrongful death actions only for 
persons and viable fetuses.”436  Opponents to the new law felt that any 
law “affording the embryo [or] fetus rights comparable to those now 
held by persons  . . . effectively establish[ed] new rights for fetuses [or] 
embryos [which] could be subject to constitutional challenge.”437  
Despite concerns about the bill’s focus “on the result of actions to the 
embryo or fetus, and not on injury to the pregnant woman,”438 the bill’s 
enactment was supported by Right to Life of Michigan and Planned 
Parenthood Affiliates of Michigan.439 
C.  Analysis 
Although the statute has not yet been interpreted in a published 
opinion,440 the legislature’s apparent intent was to provide recovery for 
the death of an embryo or fetus, without regard to viability.441  This 
intent is also consistent with current Michigan tort law that permits a 
 
 432. House Leg. Analysis, H.B. 4524, (April 18, 1997). 
 433. House Leg. Analysis, H.B. 4524, (May 11, 1997). 
 434. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West 2000).  Sub. H.B. 4524, 1998 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Mich. 1998). 
 435. The bill was signed into law on July 1, 1998 and became effective Jan. 1, 1999.  Enrolled 
H.B. 4524, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998). 
 436. Senate Fiscal Agency, S.B. 346, p. 3 (Aug. 4, 1998). 
 437. Id. at 4. 
 438. Id.  Interestingly, the law was later amended to add the word “death.”  S.B. 346, 2001 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2001).  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West Supp. 2003). 
 439. House Leg. Analysis, H.B. 4524, (May 11, 1998).  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
600.2922a, as it was worded when it went into effect on Jan. 1, 1999, contained the same wording 
as the bill supported by these groups in May of 1998. 
 440. In fact, in a recent case involving the miscarriage of a fetus of 17 ½ weeks gestational age, 
neither the parties nor the court raised any discussion about the applicability of this statute.  
McClain v. U. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 665 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). 
 441. See supra notes 429-39 and accompanying text. 
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child, later born alive, to recover for his or her injuries incurred at any 
point during gestation.442  This interpretation would also be consistent 
with the general intent of the wrongful death act; it would prevent a 
tortfeasor from benefitting by causing death of, rather than just injury to, 
the embryo or previable fetus.443  But in its current form, the act is, at 
best, overly vague and ambiguous, and at worst, meaningless, as 
demonstrated by the variety of ways the act has been discussed or 
classified by legal scholars. 
West Publishing has classified this act under the topic Assault and 
Battery.444  In Michigan Civil Jurisprudence, the act is classified under 
Damages to Pregnant Women.445  And in Michigan’s Non-Standard Jury 
Instructions, Civil, the act is in the Stalking chapter and classified as a 
wrongful act against a pregnant individual.446  These interpretations are 
inconsistent with the apparent legislative intent in enacting this section, 
but, after analyzing each section of the act, it is not difficult to see how 
this confusion arose. 
1.  Numbering 
This act is numbered § 600.2922a, and the wrongful death act is 
numbered 600.2922.447  In Michigan, statutory numbering is done by the 
Legislative Service Bureau448 under the authority given it by statute.449  
In assigning the statutory number, the Legislative Service Bureau 
evaluates the subject matter of the bill or law and assigns it a number, 
keeping closely related materials as numerically near to each other as 
possible.450  Here, the bill’s connection by numbering to the wrongful 
 
 442. See e.g. Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971). 
 443. The “common-sense principles . . . apply equally as well to the death of a nonviable 
unborn child as they do to a nonviable unborn child who suffers a tortious injury and survives birth 
and a viable unborn child who suffers a tortious injury and dies en ventre sa mere.”  Farley v. Sartin, 
466 S.E.2d 522, 533 (W. Va. 1995). 
 444. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West 2000). 
 445. 7 MICH. CIV. JUR. DAMAGES § 38 (stating that the tortfeasor is liable for damages 
resulting in a miscarriage or stillbirth).  But the statute must have been intended to remedy more 
than just harm that the mother incurred because those damages were already compensable before 
the statute was enacted.  See Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Consol. Ry. Co., 61 N.W. 11, 12 (Mich. 
1894) (“the jury is allowed to consider. . ., for the purposes of compensation, not only the physical 
pain, but also mental suffering”). 
 446. MICH. NON-STANDARD JURY INSTR. CIVIL § 23:05 (Cumm. Supp. 2003). 
 447. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (West 2000). 
 448. Id. at p. III. 
 449. Id. at §4.1105. 
 450. Telephone Interview with Roger Peters, Legal Editor, Legislative Service Bureau (April 
2, 2003). 
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death act and its legislative history show that the legislature clearly 
intended this act to amend the wrongful death act to include a cause of 
action for the stillbirth or death of an embryo or previable fetus.451 
2.  Catch line 
The act’s catch line reads: “Wrongful or negligent act against 
pregnant individual resulting in miscarriage, stillbirth, or injury to [or 
death of]452 embryo or fetus”453  Although the catch line suggests that 
this act creates a cause of action for the injuries suffered by a pregnant 
woman, it is not a part of the statute and it cannot broaden or narrow the 
meaning of the text of the statute.454  Therefore, the words “against [the] 
pregnant individual,” in the catch line cannot narrow the meaning of the 
words in the text, which specifically creates a cause of action for the 
“miscarriage, stillbirth . . . or death of the embryo or fetus.”455 
3.  Provisions of Sec.2922a(1) 
Section one of the act provides: “A person who commits a wrongful 
or negligent act against a pregnant individual is liable for damages if the 
act results in a miscarriage or stillbirth by that individual, or physical 
injury to [or the death of]456 the embryo or fetus.”457  Before this law was 
enacted, a woman already had a cause of action for her own injuries, 
including those associated with a miscarriage,458 and so did a child who 
suffered a previability prenatal injury and was later born alive.459  In 
interpreting a statute, the courts presume “that the Legislature did not 
intend to do a useless thing.”460  So here, the only “useful thing” done by 
this section was to create a cause of action for the miscarriage, stillbirth, 
or death of the embryo or previable fetus.461   
 
 451. “An amendment to a statute will generally be considered as a part of the original act and 
the entire act as amended be given the construction which would be given it if the amendment were 
a part of the original act.” Perry v. Hogarth, 246 N.W. 214, 215 (Mich. 1933) (citations omitted). 
 452. The words “or death of” were added in 2001.  See supra note 439. 
 453. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West Supp. 2003). 
 454. Id. at § 8.4b. 
 455. Id. at § 600.2922a(1). 
 456. Id. at § 600.2922a. The legislature’s addition of these words further indicates its intent. 
 457. Id. 
 458. See, e.g., Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Consol. Ry. Co., 61 N.W. 11 (Mich. 1894). 
 459. See, e.g., Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971). 
 460. Recorders Court v. City of Detroit, 351 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). 
 461. Amendments are to be given effect, and the purpose of any amendment is to change the 
original act to better carry out the purpose for which it was enacted. Perry v. Hogarth, 246 N.W. 
214, 215 (Mich. 1933). 
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Upon further analysis, it also becomes clear that this provision was 
not intended to be read alone, because, although it creates a cause of 
action, it provides no information about who can bring the cause of 
action or what damages are available for the miscarriage, stillbirth, or 
death of an embryo or fetus. 
Under the common law, there was no cause of action for the 
stillbirth or death of a fetus, so the cause of action must be created by 
statute.462  And where a cause of action is only created by statute, the 
statute creates the exclusive remedy for the wrong, “unless the remedy is 
plainly inadequate.”463  Read alone, this statute’s remedy is not 
inadequate, it is missing, unless this act is read in pari materia464 with the 
wrongful death act.  Here, it is appropriate to read the two acts as being 
in pari materia465 because both acts relate to the same common 
legislative purpose: holding tortfeasors liable for acts that cause death.  
As such, they should be read together.466  This later statute should be 
read to supplement or compliment the wrongful death act.467  And it 
should be interpreted as showing a legislative policy change intended to 
permit a cause of action for the stillbirth or death of an embryo or 
previable fetus, and the provisions of the state’s general wrongful death 
act should be used to determine who can bring the cause of action and 
what damages apply for the liability imposed under section 600.2922a 
(1). 
Accordingly, the most logical interpretation of who would bring the 
cause of action would be a personal representative,468 who could recover 
damages, including those for the embryo or previable fetus’s conscious 
pain and suffering.469  This interpretation has created constitutional 
concerns, as stated by the opponents of the original bill and multiple 
 
 462. Powers v. City of Troy, 156 N.W.2d 530, 532-33 (Mich. 1968). 
 463. Bell v. League Life Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), overruled in 
part by Smith v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 597 N.W.2d 28 (Mich. 1999). 
 464. “It is a cannon of construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be construed 
together so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the 
same subject.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (7th ed. 1999). 
 465. This is appropriate, even though they do not reference each other. County Rd Ass’n v. Bd. 
of State Canvassers, 282 N.W.2d 774, 780 (Mich. 1979). 
 466. Remus v. City of Grand Rapids, 265 N.W. 755, 756 (Mich. 1936). 
 467. See Ziegler v. Witherspoon, 49 N.W.2d 318, 329 (Mich.1951) (stating that a later act on 
the same subject should be interpreted as supplementing or complimenting the earlier statute). 
 468. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 600.2922(2) (West 2000). 
 469. Id. at § 600.2922(6).  Survival-type damages should be excluded in a claim based on the 
death of an embryo or previable fetus, as they may raise Constitutional concerns.  See infra notes 
452 and accompanying text. 
42
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss1/2
MARKS2-CHRIS EXTRA.DOC 2/16/2004  11:01 AM 
2004] PERSON V. POTENTIAL 83 
legal scholars.470 
4.  Provisions of 600.2922a (2)(a)(b)(c) 
This section of the act sets out exceptions to the liability imposed in 
section one.  It specifically states: 
This section does not apply to any of the following: 
(a)  An act committed by the pregnant individual. 
(b)  A medical procedure performed by physician or other licensed 
medical professional within the scope of his or her practice and 
with the pregnant individual’s consent or the consent of an 
individual who may lawfully provide consent on her behalf or 
without consent as necessitated by a medical emergency. 
(c) The lawful dispensation, administration, or prescription of 
medication.471 
Analyzed together, it appears that these sections were added to 
protect a woman’s constitutionally protected rights to an abortion.  But, 
if this was the intent, then they are unnecessary, because it is neither 
wrongful nor negligent for a woman to abort an embryo or previable 
fetus.472  Therefore, section one would never apply, and there would be 
no need for these exceptions. 
5.  Provisions of 600.2922a(3)(4) 
These two sections provide: “(3) This section does not prohibit a 
civil action under any other applicable law.  (4) As used in this section, 
‘physician or other licensed medical professional’ means a person 
licensed under article 15 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 
333.16101 to 333.18838.” 
It does not appear that either of these sections creates additional 
confusion.  In fact, section three would be necessary to prevent the 
exceptions addressed in number two from being too broadly 
construed.473 
 
 470. Senate Fiscal Agency, S.B. 346, Aug. 4, 1998, p. 3.  See, e.g., Wendy C. Shapero, Does a 
Nonviable Fetus’s Right to Bring a Wrongful Death Action Endanger a Woman’s Right to Choose? 
27 SW. U. L. REV. 325 (1993). 
 471. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 600.2922a(2)(a)(b)(c) (West Supp. 2003). 
 472. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 473. Other currently recognized causes of action, including common-law causes of action, are 
retained against these persons by provision three.  See Bristol Window & Door, Inc., v. Hoogenstyn, 
650 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). 
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V.  REDRAFTED VERSION OF THE ACT 
Because of the numerous problems identified in the current version 
of the act, it should be amended to reflect accurately the legistature’s 
intent in enacting the law.  Below is a suggested revision. This version 
clarifies who may bring the claim and what damages are available, and it 
protects a woman’s constitutional right to choose whether or not she will 
carry an embryo or fetus to viability by excluding survival-type damages 
that may be interpreted as granting constitutional personhood to the 
embryo or fetus. 
600.2922a Liability for Wrongful Death of an Embryo or Fetus 
(1) Whenever a person’s wrongful or negligent act474 results in the 
miscarriage, stillbirth, or death of the embryo or fetus, that person is 
liable for those damages set forth in subsection (4) of this act. 
(2) An action under this section must be brought by, and in the 
name of, the personal representative of the estate the embryo or fetus.475 
(3) The person or persons who may be entitled to damages under 
this section are limited to those who would have been the parents, 
grandparents, brothers, or sisters of the embryo or fetus.476 
(4) The court or jury may award damages incurred by the embryo 
or fetus’ estate for reasonable medical, hospital, funeral, and burial 
expenses; and the court or jury may award damages for the loss of 
society and companionship suffered by the persons entitled to damages 
under subsection (3).477 
(5) This section does not prohibit a civil action under any other 
applicable law. 478 
 
 474. This wording eliminates the need for current subparts two and three because legal 
abortions are not wrongful or negligent. 
 475. By permitting a personal representative to bring the cause of action on behalf of the 
persons listed in sub-part three, it is clear that the cause of action survives, even if the pregnant 
woman dies along with the fetus.  There are no constitutional rights raised because a legal abortion 
is neither wrongful or negligent. 
 476. Under the general wrongful death act, these persons would be entitled to recovery for their 
losses. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 600.2922(3)(a) (West 2000). 
 477. By limiting the recoverable damages to those incurred by the persons listed, there is no 
concern that the embryo or previable fetus is given constitutional rights of personhood because the 
act would compensate living persons for their loss, without awarding survival-type damages. 
 478. This provision will retain all other causes of action currently available under statute or 
common law.  See Bristol Window & Door, Inc., v. Hoogenstyn, 650 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
State legislatures need to take action to clarify whether a cause of 
action can be maintained when an embryo or fetus dies as a result of a 
wrongful or negligent act.  And when they take action, they must do so 
in a way that clearly states the answer. 
Although some believe that allowing a personal representative to 
bring a cause of action after the death of an embryo or previable fetus 
may erode a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion, as discussed 
above, with properly enacted legislation (1) the estate, which suffered 
financial damages, and would-be family members who were deprived of 
the future society and companionship may be compensated; (2) no 
constitutional rights are conveyed to the embryo or previable fetus; and 
(3) the pregnant woman’s constitutional right to chose whether to carry 
the previable embryo or fetus to viability are protected. 
To accomplish these things without eroding the woman’s right to 
chose an abortion, the statute should not award any damages that convey 
any right of personhood: survival-type damages.  It should specifically 
set out the damages recoverable by the estate and family members who 
had the right to expect that this embryo or fetus would one day be a 
member of his or her family, and compensate those persons for the 
injuries they suffered as a result of the tortfeasor’s action.  If these 
guidelines are followed, the woman’s constitutional right would not be 
infringed, and it would, instead, be better protected because the 
tortfeasor would not be allowed to escape liability for his or her action 
that deprived the woman of her right to chose whether to carry this 
embryo or previable fetus to viability. 
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